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THE INTERNATIONAL-DOMESTIC DICHOTOMY
OF THE UNITED STATES AVIATION LAW AND
THE PROPOSED AIR TRAVEL
COMPENSATION ACT
Samuel W. Bettwy*
"[I]magination at all events struggles to idealize and to unify." 1
INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of commercial aviation technology has resulted in a
number of complex and novel legal issues. The underlying character of all law is
that it provides a civilization with the power to create order 2 in a manner that is
fair to all related interests.3 Two factors unique to the commercial aviation indus-
try have put this power of law to a difficult test.
First, commercial jets routinely transport substantial numbers of passengers of
varying nationalities to remote places at increasingly faster speeds.4 In route, the
planes often travel through the airspace of numerous sovereignties. As a result,
United States aviation laws, unlike other United States laws, have not developed
in a purely domestic environment.5 As business flourished, aviation demanded
the development of laws designed to resolve not only "domestic" but also "inter-
* Attorney, State Bars of Arizona, California, and the District of Columbia; B.A. Economics, Pomona
College, 1976; J.D., California Western School of Law, 1980; LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1985.
The author wrote this article in connection with his graduate studies in International and Compar-
ative Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. A special acknowledgement is made to Messrs.
Allan I. Mendelsohn and Francis Willis both of whom provided the author with insight and substan-
tial background information for this article's preparation.
1. S. COLDERIGE, BIOGRAPHIE LITERATURIA 202 (1817 & photo reprint 1939).
2. "[M]an is constrained ... to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world
in which he has to live." J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57 (5th ed. 1955).
3. This is especially true if one subscribes to the thinking of legal realists. Llewellyn, for example, as-
serted: "One starts with the interest. That is a social fact or factor of some kind, existing independent
of the law. And it has value independent of the law. Indeed, its protection is the purpose of substan-
tive legal rights, of legal rules, of precepts of substantive law." Llewelly, A Realistic Jurisprudence-
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). See also F. SETARO, WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND
(1942).
4. Between 1925 and 1929, the larger airliners could travel at cruising speeds of about 100 miles per hour
and over stages of about 500 miles. Today the SST and the Concorde supersonic jets can travel non-
stop between New York and Paris in about three hours. See A.F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW-
CASES AND MATERIALS Cb. 7, § 2.1 (2d ed. 1981). Concurrently, air traffic and the number of pas-
sengers carried has increased steadily. For example, for the past ten years (1974-1983), the number of
passengers in international air traffic on scheduled flights has risen on the average of seven percent
every year except from 1981 to 1982. 39 ICAO BULL. July 1984 at 14.
5. When the Warsaw Convention convened in 1929, civil aviation was only on the threshhold of exist-
ence. The planners of the convention were anticipating that civil aviation would necessarily mean
international transportation. The capability of the airplane to overcome geographical barriers far sur-
passed the capabilities of the automobile, railroad engines and steamships. See LOWENFELD, supra
note 4 at Ch. 7, § 2.1. United States law related to civil aviation therefore did not have much time to
develop before the entry into the Warsaw Convention. By comparison, Germany adopted an Air
Traffic Law in 1922 only seven years before the Warsaw Convention was concluded. See note 142
infra. The law was finally amended to achieve conformity with the Convention in 1943. Law of
January 26, 1943, [1943] 1 Reichsgesetzblatt 69.
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national" issues.6 The impact of foreign interests upon the law's development
made a comprehensive and uniformly fair system difficult to achieve.
Second, the fundamental relationships between those entities whose interests
are governed by aviation law have changed dramatically and rapidly.7 As a result,
laws designed to provide order and fairness to these entities quickly become obso-
lete and ineffective. The problem of rapid obsolescence is exacerbated by the un-
avoidably slow and tedious process of changing existing laws. When aviation laws
change, the alteration has purposely increased the protection afforded to one
group at the expense of another group. In this regard, the groups whose interests
have most often been balanced against each other are those of commercial air
carriers and the traveling public.
The United States lawmakers' first response to the competing interests in the
aviation field was to establish an international-domestic dichotomy. The Warsaw
Convention created that dichotomy 1929.8 Since the dichotomy's inception, how-
ever, Congress has disowned the original concept of the Warsaw Convention, 9 and
the courts in turn have limited its application.1 0 In light of this renunciation, one
views with some consternation recent attempts at legislation to supplant the War-
saw Convention.
The proposed Air Travel Compensation Act (ATCA) is the most recent com-
prehensive legislation designed to establish order and fairness in aviation law. t t
Unfortunately, ATCA pays homage to the continued existence of an interna-
tional-domestic dichotomy, despite the dichotomy's all but official demise. This
article reviews ATCA and its problems in a four-step method. First, the article
traces the evolution of the international-domestic dichotomy in aviation law from
its inception in the Warsaw Convention to its reappearance in ATCA. Second,
the article examines the proposed scope and function of ATCA. Third, the article
considers some of the potential conflicts within aviation law which ATCA's enact-
ment would create. Fourth, the article recommends improvements to ATCA.
6. See, e.g., Northwest Air et. al., North Atlantic Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319 (international and domestic
concerns influenced the award of international air routes to United States carriers).
7. The interests are those of the travelling public, air carriers, aircraft manufacturers, air traffic control-
lers, and to some extent, the airports. In the infancy of the aviation industry, air travel posed a
considerable risk to the travelling public, so the decision was practically (though not legally) an "as-
sumption of the risk." One alleged social interest was to protect the industry from lawsuits which
were likely to ensue and the costs of which burgeoning companies would be unable to absorb. As the
industry grew and air travel became safer, the ability to absorb lawsuits became much greater, and the
travelling public did not perceive air travel as such a risk. Therefore the social interest in protecting
the air carriers diminished.
8. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct.
12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982), [hereinafter cited as the
Warsaw Convention]. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 40 and 43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
11. H.R. 4479, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. HI, 578-79 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as A TCA]. The bill was introduced by Representative Anderson, (D.-Cal.) and previously known
as the Air Travel Protection Act in a draft submitted, though not introduced, in the 97th Congress.
See 48 J. AIR L. & Co. M. 263, 275-82 (1982). The Act provided no-fault compensation for injuries or
death arising out of domestic aircraft accidents in accident victims who were residents of the United
States. Damages were limited to economic losses. Pain or suffering would not have been compen-
sated. The total amount recoverable by all claimants could have been limited to the amount of insur-
ance carried by the airline as directed by regulations established by the Secretary of Transportation.
Id.
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THE "INTERNATIONAL" ELEMENT OF THE DICHOTOMY:
ITS RISE AND FALL
The Warsaw Convention
In the early 1900's, the aviation industry was embryonic worldwide.' 2 During
this period, the incubative assistance of protective legislation maintained the in-
dustry's viability.1 3 The technical state of aviation was such that fatal accidents
were frequent, especially by today's standards.' 4 This caused many to believe that
the industry could not afford to insure itself against unlimited liability. 5 In a
cooperative effort to protect the avaition industry, a substantial portion of the
international community entered the Warsaw Convention. 6
The Convention resulted from work done at conferences convened in Paris in
1925 and in Warsaw in 1929, and from work done in the interim by the Comit6
International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens.' 7 Delegates to the confer-
ences established as their primary objective an agreement to insulate air carriers
from unlimited liability for personal injury and property damage caused by acci-
dents during international transportation. Many countries, including the United
States, and several states within the United States, had already recognized con-
tractual limitations on damages or liability through their respective domestic
laws.' 8 The convention delegates, however, considered this piecemeal protection
to be inadequate. They sought to protect "national industries"' 9 against suits
brought in other countries, or states of the United States,2 ' without liability
limits.
The United States' delegates agreed to the proposed limitations on the interna-
tional travel liability of air carriers within the scope of the Warsaw Convention.22
The liability limitation was set at about $4,898,23 and it applied under circum-
stances defined in Article 1(2) as follows:
[A]ny transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a
12. See supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., note 29 infra and accompanying text. See also LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at Ch. 7, § 2.1.
"[I]t was expected that such a limit, applied uniformly on international flights-and, it was hoped,
internally as well through corresponding legislation in the member countries-would enable airlines to
attract capital that might otherwise be scared away by the fear of a single catastrophic accident." Id.
14. Between 1925 and 1929, there were 45 fatal accidents for every 100 million miles flown. 26 ICAO
BULL. (May 1971) at 43. In 1950, fatalities per 100 million miles flown were 3.02. 26 ICAO BULL.
(May 1971) at 4. In 1960, airplane fatalities dropped to 1.76 per 100 million miles, Id., and to 0.64 per
100 million miles in 1970. 34 ICAO BULL. (June 1979) at 54. In 1983, the number of fatal accidents
per 100 million miles flown was 0.35. 39 ICAO BULL. (July 1984) at 44.
15. See supra note 13 and infra note 29 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 26.
17. This committee was created at the Paris conference. The Warsaw Conference records were originally
in French; for an English translation, see R. Homer & D. Legrez, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW (1975).
18. For a discussion on limitations of liability under federal law for interstate common carriers, see Com-
ment, Limitations on Liability: Passenger Injuries and Baggage Losses on Land, Sea and Air, 34 TUL.
L. REV. 354 (1960). For examples of state law and its development, see Donovan, The Origins and
Development of Shipowner's Liability, 53 TUL. L. REV. 999, 1000 (1979). See also infra Notes 101-102.
19. This term includes both nationally operated air carriers and the privately operated air carriers of a
particular nation.
20. See supra note 13 and note 29.
21. See supra note 18.
22. The Convention was opened for signature on October 12, 1929; entered into force on February 13,
1933; ratified by the United States on June 15, 1934; and entered into force for the United States on
October 29, 1934. See supra note 8.
23. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 22; "(Liability will be] ... limited to the sum of 125,000 francs
... deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of
fineness of nine hundred thousandths." Today the amount converts to about $13,750.
19851
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 12:25
break in the transportation. .. are situated either within the territories of two
High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or other power, even though that power is
not a party to this convention.2 4
Thus the international-domestic dichotomy was conceived. 25
The United States Senate ratified the Warsaw Convention in 1934,26 at a time
when the aviation industry's need for protection was still apparent.2 7 Indeed, the
fatality rate in 1929 was 45 per 100 million passenger miles.28 Secretary of State
Cordell Hull wrote at the time that "the principle of limitation of liability would
be an aid in the development of international air transportation. '2 9 Although the
Senate agreed to limit liability arising out of international travel, it did not extend
the same principle to domestic air transportation under federal law. Thus the
international-domestic dichotomy came to fruition in the United States.
The Dichotomy's Demise
Soon after ratification, it became apparent that the Warsaw Convention suf-
fered from several fundamental defects. Some of the problems resulted from am-
biguous drafting. Interpretation of article 1(2)," for example, produced
inconsistent results which led to concern over whether the convention was achiev-
ing its intended purpose. Moreover, even textually clear provisions resulted in
confusion. It was unclear, for example, why foreign carriers whose governments
had not ratified the convention should be protected by it in American courts,3 ' or
why form should supersede substance in the contract of carriage.3 2
More funadamentally, however, the convention suffered as a result of techno-
logical and legal developments which challenged its underlying premises. By the
24. Id. art. 1(2). For an example of how the same definition can be improved by clarity of expression, see
article l(f) of the International Convention For The Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the
Carriage of Passengers by Sea, done Apr. 29, 1961, reprinted in M. EVANS & M. STANFORD, IV
TRANSPORT LAWS OF THE WORLD at I/E/10 (1983): "(llnternational carriage means any carriage in
which according to the contract of carriage the place of departure and the place of destination are
situated in a single State if there is an immediate port of call in another State, or in two different
States."
25. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. This dichotomy pertained not only to limitations of
liability but also to other issues such as jurisdiction, liability, burden of proof, notice, statute of limita-
tions, and choice of law. Other issues not covered by the Warsaw Conventionn were to be settled
under domestic law. These domestic law issues included allowable types of damages, measure of dam-
ages, contributory negligence, venue, settlement inducement, apportionment of liability between or
among defendants, attorney fees, court costs and certain other choice of law issues.
26. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982). See supra note 8. The United States is a party to the Multilateral Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, which con-
cluded at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, and entered into force for the United States on October 29,
1934. Forty-three countries joined the pact which committed itself to the greatest degree of competi-
tion that is compatible with a well functioning international air transport system. The United States
amended the 1934 legislation with the International Air Transport Competition Act of 1979. Pub. L.
No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 42 (1980).
27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 14.
29. S. EXEC. Doc. No. C., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
30. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
31. See Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S.A., 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952) (a Cuban corpo-
ration which was not a contracting party to the Warsaw Convention received the benefit of the Con-
vention's limited liability provisions).
32. See Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955) (American Airlines' failure to refer
to an intermediate stop on its airline tickets was held not to constitute "willful misconduct" sufficient
to trigger the unlimited liability provision); Berner v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (pilot's failure to follow instruction to maintain altitude was held to constitute willful
misconduct). See also Georgakis v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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time of the Convention's ratification, its underlying purpose, limiting air-carrier
liability under Federal law, had become suspect for two reasons. First, increased
safety in air travel meant that the industry required less protection from liabil-
ity.33 The second, and equally important development, was that the states of the
United States had begun to invalidate limited liability provisions as a matter of
state law.34 Even as the Warsaw Convention was in the process of being ratified
by the United States in 1934, a trend had begun among the states to invalidate
contractual provisions that would limit a common carrier's liability for negligent
injury to its passengers. 35 As a result such contractual provisions were valid only
where they were not invalidated by state statute, case law, or constitutional provi-
sion. By the mid-1960's, all states of the United States had made such invalidat-
ing law in one form or another.36
Practically overnight what had been considered a fair system of law had come
to be seen as unfair. 37 In the United States, it was this perceived unfairness that
led to the decline in adherence to the principles of the Warsaw Convention.38
Each branch of the Federal Government played a role in contributing to this
decline.
Executive and Legislative Responses.
The executive branch, operating primarily through the State Department,
sought to maintain adherence to the Convention while, at the same time, limiting
its negative effects. The Department attempted to implement this policy in a se-
ries of international conferences. It sought to negotiate the highest possible limits
on awards while still remaining within a limited liability framework. At the
Hague Conference in 1955, the limit was doubled; 39 at the Montreal conference in
1966, agreement was reached among the air carriers to raise the limit to
$75,000;4' and at the Gautemala City conference in 1971, the limit was raised to
$100,000.41 Although the State Department was instrumental in achieving these
higher limits, the Senate has never ratified the amendments.
The reason for this conflict between the Senate and the State Department is
quite simple. It has become obvious that the Senate is not willing to participate in
the adoption of any treaties containing liability limitation provisions. On the
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 18.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See LOWENFELD, supra note 4, Ch. 7, § 4.11. "Debates concerning revision of the Warsaw Conven-
tion began almost as soon as the Convention came into effect .... [T]hose arguing for higher limits
pointed out that ... as a result of improvement in air safety, liability insurance could be obtained by
the carriers at much lower cost per passenger mile than when the Convention was negotiated." Id.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39-61 on the response of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the United States Government.
39. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, done Sept. 28, 1955, reprinted in M. EVANS & M.
STANFORD, supra note 24, at I/C/4.
40. Agreement relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, May
13, 1966, CAB Agreement No. 18990 Docket No. 17325: Order No. E-23680 [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Agreement]. For an account of the events leading up to the conclusion of the agreement,
including the text of the denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the United States and subsequent
withdrawal of that denunciation, see Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J.
AIR L. & COM. 291 (1965).
41. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 as Amended by the Protocols done at the
Hague on September 28, 1955. For the full text See 64 MATERIALS DEP'T ST. BULL. 555 (1971) and
Int'l Legal Materials. 613 (1971). For a discussion of the amendments, see Mankiewicz, Warsaw Con-
vention: The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 335 (1972).
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other hand, the State Department apparently perceives a need to maintain cooper-
ative international relations even if it means preserving the outdated principle of
limited liability. One might explain this difference by the theory that elected rep-
resentatives would be more sensitive to a nationwide abandonment of the principle
of limitation of liability by state legislatures and courts.
Caught between the United States Senate and the international community,
the State Department finally produced its own solution. In 1965, the Department
threatened to denounce the Warsaw Convention if higher limitations of liability
could not be achieved.4 2 While this declaration failed to motivate Senate action, it
did cause worldwide concern among air carriers.43 The threat of denunciation by
the State Department of the Warsaw Convention raised for air carriers the specter
of total loss of protection against American-style jury awards." Thus, the threat
provided a lever, through which the State Department could exert pressure on air
carriers to implement the desired modifications to the Convention. This means of
implementation bypassed the Senate ratification requirement by remaining within
the framework of the Warsaw Convention.
The solution was keyed to article 22(1) of the agreement which provides in
pertinent part: "[B]y special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to
a higher limit of liability."45 By putting this clause into effect, the air carriers
became parties to the Montreal Agreement under which the limit of liability was
raised to $75,000 in 1966.46
Response of the Judiciary.
During the same period, the judiciary also participated in safeguarding the
interests of those injured by air carriers. By the early 1950's, judges began ruling
that the limitations of the Warsaw Convention did not apply. In the "wilful mis-
conduct, ' '4 7 "delivery," 4 and "notice," '49 cases, the courts found in favor of plain-
42. "The United States of America wishes to state that it gives this notification solely because of the low
limits of liability for death or personal injury provided in the Warsaw Convention .. " Notice of
Denunciation as printed in 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 291, 303 (1965). See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 546-52 (1967); Kreindler,
supra note 40.
43. Lowenfield & Mendelson, supra note 42, at 539, 547-48.
44. Id. at 534.
45. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 22(1).
46. Montreal Agreement, supra note 40. The so-called agreement is, of course, not really between "the
carrier and the passenger," and it does more than set "a higher limit of liability." In addition, art. 1(2)
imposes a standard of absolute liability on the air carrier. See id. at art. 1(2). The Montreal Agree-
ment is more accurately described as the air carriers' concession to the State Department in exchange
for its withdrawal of its denunciation of the Warsaw Convention. Whether or not a concession is valid
within the context of the Warsaw Convention without legislative enacment, the Montreal Agreement
has been recognized by the United States courts as a valid exercise of power effectively granted by the
Warsaw Convention. In fact, no American court has raised the issue of the Agreement's validity
although enforced by the courts many times. The result of this agreement between the air carriers and
the State Department has been to preserve the international-domestic dichotomy in aviation law for
the present. See, e.g., Manion v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 398, 434 N.E.2d
1060, 449 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1982). (In Manion, a suit was brought to recover against the airline for
injury sustained by a passenger when terrorists attacked the plane. The New York Court held that if a
passenger's roundtrip ticket was contracted for as a whole, and if the airline failed to deliver to a
passenger a ticket containing notice of Warsaw Convention's liability limitations at the outset of her
trip, the airline could not invoke the liability limitations of the Convention. The case was remanded
for determination of whether a ticket was delivered to the passenger at the outset of her trip within the
terms of the Convention.)
47. See, e.g., Pekelis v. Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied
341 U.S. 951 (1951). In Pekelis the plaintiff brought an action for the death of her husband. The
Court of Appeals held that where the defendant took the position that the accident was caused by pilot
negligence not amounting to "wilful misconduct,' the report of boards organized by the defendant was
admissible as an adoptive admissions. See also Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir.
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tiffs seeking to avoid Convention limitations. The decisions held that a plaintiff
who could prove either that the air carrier had committed wilful misconduct re-
sulting in the plaintiff's injury or had failed to deliver adequate notice of the Con-
vention's existence and possible application to the plaintiff could avoid
enforcement of the limitation of liability provision.5°
Particular provisions of the Montreal Agreement of 1966 were formulated in
reaction to this line of judicial decisions. Notice requirements were specifically
outlined in the Agreement,51 to encourage carrier compliance. In addition, courts
tended to be less inclined to find wilful misconduct on the part of air carrier de-
fendants under the higher limits of the Warsaw-Montreal scheme.52
The Montreal agreement notwithstanding, plaintiffs and the courts soon dis-
covered ways to avoid the new limitations5 3 and the agreement's $75,00 limit only
temporarily dampened concern over the perceived "unfairness" of limitations on
liability. With the development of products liability law in the United States,54
plaintiffs found that they could successfully sue not only the air carrier, but also
aircraft manufacturers and air traffic controllers, neither of which are afforded
protection under the Warsaw Convention.55
In addition, with the demonetization of gold in the United States, attempts
were made to call the enforceability of Article 22 of the Convention into ques-
tion.5 6 Article 22 states that "the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall
be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs..." with the franc "consisting of 65 1/2
milligrams of gold. . . . In Franklin Mint v. TWA Inc.5 the limitation of lia-
1955); KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
48. See, e.g., Mertens v. The Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965). The court held that
virtually unreadable liability limitation printed on ticket was not binding on the passenger to whom it
was not delivered until after he had boarded the airplane.
49. See e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966). The court held that the
passengers' ticket and baggage checks which were combined in the form of small printed booklets
containing footnotes printed in type so as to render them unnoticeable, unreadable, and virtually invis-
ible, were insufficient to notify passengers that exclusion or limitation provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention were applicable, and the airline could not exclude or limit its liability under the Convention.
50. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, arts. 3 and 25.
51. Montreal Agreement, supra note 40, at art. 2.
52. The courts, for example, strictly applied the notice provisions of the Montreal Agreement. See e.g., In
re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983). The court
held that an airline's violation of notice provisions of the Montreal Agreement deprived it of the
Agreement's liability limitations and prevented it from raising defenses under the Warsaw Convention.
53. The courts, for example, strictly applied the notice provisions of the Montreal Agreement. See e.g., In
re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983) (The court
held that an airline's violation of notice provisions of the Montreal Agreement deprived it of liability
limitations of the agreement and prevented it from raising defenses under the Warsaw Convention.)
54. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95 (5th ed. 1984).
55. See In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (D. Cal. 1975). The court held that on
the face of their texts neither the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, nor the Montreal Agree-
ment were applicable to the United States, the manufacturer, or the dealer-broker who sold the plane
which was the subject of the suits. This decision has been followed in other federal courts. See e.g.,
Leof v. United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1979). See also Lowenfeld, supra note 4, Ch. 7, § 2.1 ("[a]fter the DC-10 case, no one would
ever against think of compensation in an aviation disaster without looking at the manufacturer as a
potentially responsible party").
56. See e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. TWA Inc., 690 F.2d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 1982). Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention limits the carriers' liability for injuries. The various limits are stated in terms of a
specified number of French francs. The dollar value of that limit is calculated by simply converting
the gold value of the specified limit into United States dollars. The difficulty arises from the official
monetary functions, and the fact that its price was set originally by law. By international agreement
and United States domestic regulation, gold has now lost its monetary functions and no longer has an
official price. Warsaw Convention supra note 8, art. 22.
57. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
58. 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982).
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bility provision of the Warsaw Convention was held unenforceable because the
limitation is defined in terms of gold, which had been demonetized by the United
States. The court stated:
[I]nternational disarray as to the proper unit of conversion under the Con-
vention. . .must be selected either through treaty approval by the Senate or by
legislation passing both Houses of Congress. . .[but is] unfit for judicial reso-
lution. . . .[T]herefore the Convention's limits on liability. . .are unenforce-
able in the United States courts.59
The Supreme Court, however, recently reversed the Second Circuit in TWA,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. ' The Court stated: "The political branches, which
hold the authority to repudiate the Warsaw Convention, have given no indication
that they wish to do so. Accordingly, the Convention's cargo liability limitation
remains enforceable in the United States.",
6 1
This section of the article has traced the development of the international-
domestic dichotomy in United States aviation law from its birth to its present
state. With respect to limitations of liability, the raison d'etre of the Warsaw Con-
vention, the dichotomy has been virtually eradicated by state statutes and judicial
decisions. With respect to issues of jurisdiction, 62 burden of proof,63 liability,64
notice,65 statute of limitations,66 and certain choice of law issues,6 7 the dichotomy
lives on since the "domestic" side of aviation treats those issues in different
ways.68
The inconsistent approaches which the judiciary, executive and legislative
branches have taken in dealing with this dichotomy have created considerable
confusion regarding the proper disposition of these cases. One response to this
59. Id. at 311.
60. TWA, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984).
61. Id. at 1787.
62. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention determines the first step in a "two-step" process of deciding the
issue of jurisdiction. The places listed in the article are the countries in which the case may be
brought. See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965). In Mertens the court
held that under the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1), the United States qualified as a forum when an
action was brought against a carrier for the death of an airline passenger on a flight from a California
Air Force base to a base in Japan. The carrier was domiciled and had its principle place of business in
the United States, in which the contract for carriage was also made. But see Berner v. British Com-
monwealth Pacific Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). The second step of
the process is the application of domestic law to determine which court within the country has power
to hear the case. In the second step, the Warsaw Convention empowers the federal courts with subject
matter jurisdiction. See Benjamin v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1978) (court
held that the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action, not only for the loss of or damage to
baggage, but also for the wrongful death of an airline passenger), rev'd Noel v. Lines Aeropostal
Venezdana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
63. Article 20(1) of the Convention states that an air carrier "shall not be liable if he proves that he and
his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid. . . damage[s], or that it was impossible. . . to
take such measures." Montreal Agreement, supra note 40, at art. 1(2). Therefore, under the conven-
tion, the air carrier is subject to absolute liability. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 53 at
257-58.
64. The Warsaw Convention provides that its limitation on damages provision will not apply if injury to
the plaintiff results from the "wilful misconduct" of the air carrier. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8,
art. 25.
65. The notice provisions of the Warsaw Convention as clarified inn the Montreal Agreement are not
required with respect to transportation which is not international or not performed by a party to the
agreement. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 2.
66. An action governed by the Warsaw Convention is barred after two years. Id. at art. 29(1). The period
of limitations for wrongful death and personal injury varies from state to state. See W. PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 54, at 957.
67. The Warsaw Convention provides that issues of contributory negligence and the calculation of the
limitations period shall be governed by the law of the forum. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, arts.
21, 29(2).
68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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confusion is H.R. 4479, the proposed Air Travel Compensation Act (ATCA).69
Many features of the bill make it attractive to the public as well as the aviation
and insurance industries. 70 The bill provides for speedy and organized settlements
while protecting the financial stability of the aviation industry and without placing
quantitative limits on damages.7 The bill also provides the Federal courts with
rules specially designed for handling aviation claims.
Unfortunately, ATCA provides this new system of aviation law only for do-
mestic air commerce. As a result of the bill's limited applicability, ATCA regret-
tably fails to establish what could otherwise be a fair and orderly system which
provides "uniformity" to domestic and international aspects of United States avia-
tion law.
THE PROPOSED AIR TRAVEL COMPENSATION ACT:
On March 8, 1983, the Senate rejected a proposal72 intended to update the
Warsaw Convention. The package consisted of Montreal Protocol Numbers 3
and 4, as adopted at the Montreal Convention 73 and a supplemental insurance
program that would have raised the liability limits above the ceilings recom-
mended by the Montreal Protocols. In addition, the package would have elimi-
nated the "wilful misconduct" escape clause of the Warsaw Convention.74
ATCA was introduced in the House of Representatives on November 18,
1983." The bill borrowed its main feature, a supplemental compensation plan,7 6
from the Montreal package. ATCA also proposes, in Section 1702(a), a federal
private right of action, though that right is limited to claims arising from domestic
flights. The bill provides in pertinent part: "There is hereby created a. . .right
of action to recover . . .for injury or death to persons . . .other than persons
. . .being carried in international air commerce, sustained as a consequence of an
aircraft incident., 77 The scope of ATCA, therefore, reinstates the international-
domestic dichotomy of aviation law by carving out a "domestic" element to which
it will apply exclusively.78
69. See ATCA, supra note 11.
70. The bill would establish a limitation of liability that would be set for air carriers, air frame manufac-
turers and air traffic controllers. In addition, it would establish a Claims Payment Facility through
which the travelling public would pay for liabilities that went beyond the limitation. See text accom-
panying notes 81-87 infra.
71. ATCA does, however, limit the types of damages that may be awarded. See infra notes 90-96 and
accompanying text.
72. By a vote of 50-42 the Senate failed to pass the "Montreal Package." Passage required approval by a
two-thirds majority. 129 CONG. REC. § 2279 (1983). See S. EXEC. No. B., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1976), reprinted in M. EVANS & M. STANFORD, supra note 24, at I/C/8. The related debates are
located at 129 CONG. REC. § 2270-79 (1983).
73. See S. EXEC. No. B., 95th Cong., 2st Sess. (1976), reprinted in M. EVANS & M. STANFORD, supra note
24, at I/C/8. The protocols are cited as Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on October
12, 1929, as Amended by the Protocols done at The Hague on September 28, 1955, and at Guatemala
City, March 8, 1971 and Montreal Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on September 8, 1955.
74. Id. See also 129 CONG. REC. § 2278 (1983) (remarks of Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.): "It is hard for
me to believe that passengers would prefer a system where airlines know their liability is absolutely
limited, even if airlines engage in willful misconduct").
75. 129 CONG. REC. H10578-79 (1983).
76. ATCA, supra note II § 1703.
77. Id. § 1702(a).
78. The scope of ATCA is even further limited by other definitions. "Aircraft incident" means "any
occurrence involving . . . a domestic carrier during. . . domestic air commerce which results. . . in
(i) the hospitalization for more than forty-eight hours or the death of five or more persons, or (ii)
damage to property, other than damage to aircraft engaged in flight . . . in excess of $10,000,000."
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The dual purposes of ATCA parallel Warsaw Convention's purposes, though
ATCA is intended to have more comprehensive effect. ATCA is designed to pro-
vide "financial protection" in the aviation industry, and to establish a "fair, or-
derly, and expeditious federal system of assured compensation . . . ." In
keeping with the bill's intent to provide comprehensive coverage, ATCA protects
air carriers, air frame manufacturers, aircraft engine manufacturers, and air traffic
controllers."0 The bill would require each of these groups to maintain aggregate
insurance coverage at levels set by the Secretary of Transportation."'
Despite providing broad protection to the aviation industry, ATCA offers in-
jured parties almost unqualified access to the recovery of damages. Recovery is
achieved through a two-stage process. First, plaintiffs are not obligated to prove
fault; they need only file a "Public Liability Action" which gives Federal courts
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 In response to the filing of an action, liable parties
are required to pool their insurance proceeds for the purpose of immediately com-
pensating injured passengers or their survivors." The aggregate of the pooled
insurance proceeds represents the total liability of the "aviation industry" to the
injured victims.8 4 In this stage of the recovery process, plaintiffs may seek any
damages in excess of such aggregate from a terrorist attack from "The Claims
Payment Facility."85
The Claims Payment Facility is to be funded, in the event liability arises, by
the collection of a surcharge on passenger tickets and freight waybills.8 6 The
amount of the surcharge would be proposed by the defendants, approved by the
Secretary of Transportation, and collected by all domestic air carriers.8 7 The de-
fendants, who through subrogation would be the insurance companies, may ap-
portion liability among themselves through a proceeding to determine relative
fault.88 To take advantage of this provision, a defendant must file an "Apportion-
ment Action.""
On the surface, ATCA appears to protect members of the aviation industry
and their insurance companies by quantitatively limiting the aggregate liability
which may be imposed on the industry. At the same time, it appears to assure full
ATCA, supra note 11, § 1701(i)(A). "Domestic air commerce" is restricted to "the carriage, by an
aircraft having a maximum passenger seating capacity exceeding sixty seats or a maximum payload
capacity exceeding eighteen thousand pounds ...." Id. § 1701(19). Despite the attempt to create
uniform rules governing recovery, ATCA would not apply to most minor accidents, to those involving
small aircraft, or hijackings. Also, note that § 1702(c)(3)(A) excludes "claims arising out of or result-
ing from an aircraft incident if military hostilities among governments or directed at any government
were a substantial factor in producing such incident."
79. ATCA, supra note 11, §§ 2(b)(1),(3).
80. Id. § 2(b)(2).
81. Id. § 1710(b). This might create insurance requirements that are too burdensome, especially for
smaller and newer air carriers and manufacturers.
82. ATCA, supra note 11, § 1702(b).
83. Id. § 1710(b). An "interim assistance plan" is described in § 17 of the bill. It is not clear, however,
that passengers or their survivors would receive immediate assistance in case of injuries sustained in a
terrorist attack. In such cases, the insurance companies are exempted from liability. Thus, any recov-
ery to which an injured party might be entitled must be obtained through the Claims Payment Facility
by use of the "surcharge" procedure. Injured parties may be able to avoid the cumbersome
"surcharge" procedure by invocation of a "catch-all" provision which states: "The plan for the estab-
lishment of the Claims Payment Facility shall . . . provide any other terms and conditions necessary
or appropriate . . . to ensure . . .expeditious payment. ... Id. § 1712(b)(l 1).
84. Id. § 1711.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 1713.
87. Id. § 1710.
88. Id. § 1714.
89. Id. § 1714.
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recovery to passengers and their survivors for their injuries by spreading any costs
in excess of industry liability over the whole of the domestic traveling public.
Other unique features of ATCA, however, affect both the measure of damages
and the apportionment of costs between the aviation industry and the traveling
public. Section 1703 of ATCA places restrictions on recovery for pain and suffer-
ing 9° or emotional distress. 9 Likewise, recovery is generally barred for exemplary
or punitive damages. 92 Thus damages are generally limited to loss of earnings,
although an exception apparently exists for death of a survivor's spouse, child or
parent when there is no economic detriment beyond death-related expenses.93 In
such circumstances, "the court shall make an award to such survivor that is just
and reasonable, taking account of similar awards made in other cases .... ."'
The bill further limits recoveries awarded to nonresident aliens for economic det-
riment that would be awarded in the jurisdiction in which the individual was a
resident at the time of the aircraft incident.9 5 Finally, no provision is made for
personal injury or property damage on the ground.96
Obviously, ATCA's compensation scheme is designed primarily to protect the
aviation industry and its insurance companies. Other provisions of ATCA are
intended to provide a uniform legal system, under federal auspices, to resolve
claims orderly and expeditiously. 97 In addition, the Act provides a formula for
measuring economic detriment" and rules regarding jurisdiction," venue," at-
torney fees, 10' court costs, 10 2 contributory negligence,10 3 settlement induce-
ment, t ° 4  statute of limitations,' 0 5  apportionment of liability 10 6  and jury
90. Damages for pain and suffering will be awarded if the "claimant has sustained serious and permanent
of disfigurement (sic) ... or more than ninety days of total disability . Id. at § 1703(a)(2)(B).
91. Id. § 1703(a)(2)(A).
92. Id. § 1703(a)(3).
93. Id. § 1703(a)(5). "Economic deteriment includes (a) "allowable expenses," such as medical treatment
and related procedures, (b) "loss of income" from injury, (c) "replacement services loss"-services
which had to be procured because the person killed in the airline disaster was thus unable to provide
them for his family, (d) "survivor loss"-lost income to the family due to the decedent's death, less
(e) "Government payments" received by the survivors and (f) "income tax saving" to the extent that
recovery under the act is not taxable income.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 1703(b).
96. Examination of the bill fails to reveal any mechanism to trigger such recovery. See id. §§ 1702(a),
1702(c)(3), 1703(a). In general, under the ATCA, a victim is protected by determining whether the
related flight was "domestic air commerce." Since this depends upon the contract of carriage and
since persons on the ground would have no contracts of carriage, there is no way to bring them within
ATCA without a specific provision for doing so.
97. Section 1702(a) creates a "sole and exclusive right of action" to recover compensation for an injury or
death to persons or damage to property being carried in international air commerce, sustained as a
consequence of an aircraft incident. Section 1702(c)(2) further provides that the "right of action pro-
vided in subsection (a) shall . . . be governed by the provisions of this title to the exclusion of any
State law, any inconsistent provision of any Federal law, and the law of any place outside the United
States."
98. Id. § 1703(a)(1).
99. Id. §§ 1707(a), 1714(b), 1718(c).
100. Id. §§ 1707(b), 1714(c). When the claimant is a resident of the United States, venue is in the District
Court where the plaintiff resides. When the plaintiff is a nonresident, venue is the district where the
accident occurred if the accident occurred within the United States, or the district where the decedent
deplaned or was bound to, if the accident occurred outside the United States.
101. Id. §§ 1709(a) & 1717(b). Reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses are recoverable by a
person who prevails in a public liability action. The District Court may also grant reasonable fees in
an apportionment action.
102. Id.
103. Id. The amount of compensation recoverable in a public liability action shall be reduced to the extent
of the failure of the plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent to take reasonable steps following an incident to
mitigate damages. Id. § 1702(b)(2).
104. Id. §§ 1705 & 1712. Parties adjudged to have contributed to the incident are required to send settle-
ment offers to next of kin and also publish the offers in a newspaper of general circulation in the
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If enacted, ATCA would change aviation law as it pertains to "domestic air
commerce."' 0' It would provide uniformity in decisions involving domestic com-
merce where inconsistencies previously existed. ATCA, however, does nothing to
resolve the inconsistencies that have arisen in the past from the dichotomy in
aviation law. Because ATCA perpetuates this dichotomy, it will necessarily fail to
be fully effective in producing uniformity even in purely domestic controversies.
THE INCOHERENCE OF AVIATION LAW UNDER ATCA
In a single air crash case, courts will resolve certain issues differently depend-
ing upon whether the plaintiff was engaged in "international transportation" as
defined in the Warsaw Convention. Under the Warsaw Convention, the distinc-
tion lies in each passenger's carriage contract or ticket.'0 9 Under ATCA, courts
will continue to distinguish among passengers in light of whether they were en-
gaged in "domestic air commerce" or in "international air commerce."
If, under ATCA, "international air commerce" were synonymous with "inter-
national air travel," the effect of the bill would simply be to supplant current rules
regarding the domestic side of the dichotomy in aviation law. The two, however,
are not synonymous. 1 0 This distinction would create new inconsistencies in avia-
tion law. These would arise under ATCA in at least three contexts: issues covered
by ATCA but not by the Warsaw Convention; protection of aircraft manufactur-
ers and air traffic controllers; and cases not covered by the Warsaw Convention or
ATCA.
The table below summarizes the relevant provisions of the Convention and
ATCA. It will serve as a useful reference for discussion of the new inconsistencies
country where the incident occurred. If the incident is a terrorist aircraft incident, the contributing
parties must set up a Claims Payment Facility. See also §§ 1701(14), 1712.
105. Id. §§ 1707(c), 1714(d). All suits must commence within two years of the date of the incident on
which the suit is based. Apportionment actions cannot be brought until after 30 days, but must be
brought within three years. Both limitation requirements can be excused by a party's written waiver.
106. Id. §§ 1714, 1716. Liability is to be comparatively apportioned.
107. Id. § 1708. Section 1708 provides:
(a) In any public liability action which is tried to a jury-
(1) the court shall instruct the jury-
(A) as to the provisions of section 1709;
(B) as to the treatment under Federal and applicable state or local income tax
laws of awards of compensation in a public liability action and of earnings on such
awards; and
(C) in cases where the court proposes to enter a judgment pursuant to subjection
(c), to disregard the effect of changes in the purchasing power of the dollar; and
(2) the court shall require a special verdict itemizing-
(A) each element of economic deteriment provided for in subparagraphs (A)
through (D) of section 1703(a)(1);
(B) each of the offsets provided for in subparagraphs (E) and (F) of sections
1703(a)(1);
(C) any allowance for pain and suffering provided for in section 1703(a)(2); and
(D) in cases where the court proposes to enter a judgment pursuant to subsection
(c), a breakdown between (i) the amount of compensation to which plaintiff is entitled
on account of damages sustained prior to the entry of judgment, and (ii) the amounts
of compensation to which plaintiff will be entitled on account of damages anticipated
to be sustained subsequent to such entry; such latter amounts shall be determined
period by period and without adjustments for changes in the purchasing power of the
dollar.
108. Id. § 1701(19).
109. For example, if the flight was from Chicago to Montreal with a stop in New York, passengers booked
through to Montreal would be subject to the Warsaw Convention while those who were booked only
to New York would not be subject to the Convention.
110. See supra note 77.
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which would arise under ATCA. Under these conditions, the inconsistencies
which presently exist as a result of the international-domestic dichotomy would
remain essentially intact.
Section Issue Warsaw Convention ATCA
S Measure of Damages domestic law F703
Types of Damages domestic law § 1702(c)(3) & 1703(a)
Contributory Negligence article 21 § 1702(b)(2)
Venue domestic law § 1707(b) & 1714(c)
Settlement Inducement domestic law §§ 1705 & 1712
Apportionment of Liability domestic law §§ 1714 & 1716
Attorney Fees and Costs domestic law § 1709(a)
Choice of Law domestic law § 1703(b)
II Limits of Liability article 22 & Montreal § 1711
Agreement, 1(1)
III Jurisdiction article 28 §§ 1702(a), 1707(a), 1714(b)
& 1718(c)
Liability/Burden of Proof article 28 §§1702(b)(1)
§§ 1702(b) & 1716(c)
Notice article 3 & Montreal N/A
Agreement 1 2
Statute of Limitations article 29(1) § 1707(c) & 1714(d)
Choice of Law article 21 none, but see § 1702(b)(2)
Wilful Misconduct article 25 § 1703(a)(3)
As discussed earlier,"' the issues listed in Section I of the table are presently
covered by the common or statutory law of the forum regardless of whether the
case is related to international transportation. Thus, a forum would resolve these
issues according to the same law for all passengers of a single air crash. ATCA,
however, would preempt state law with respect to these issues in cases related to
domestic air commerce. 1 2 Thus, under ATCA, some of those passengers would
be subject to ATCA and others to the forum law if some of them were engaged in
"domestic air commerce" while others were engaged in "international air com-
merce." Thus, ATCA would unnecessarily create a dichotomy in aviation law
where none presently exists.
The ATCA, as drafted, introduces a new inconsistency to the protection of
aircraft manufacturers and air traffic controllers (ATCs) who are presently unaf-
fected by an international-domestic dichotomy. The Warsaw Convention, as
noted above,t"3 only protects air carriers. Manufacturers and ATCs are unpro-
tected in both domestic and international cases. ATCA proposes to protect the
entire aviation industry, 114 but only with respect to domestic air commerce. As a
result, manufacturers and ATCs would remain unprotected in cases involving in-
ternational air commerce. In this area, enactment of ATCA would create a di-
chotomy of treatment between international and domestic commerce where none
had previously existed and where none is warranted. 15
ATCA states that only domestic air carriers are subject to its protection." 16
111. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 97.
113. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. At least one caveat must be mentioned in the context of this
discussion of the general rule. It is conceivable that airport authorities, including municipalities, could
also be subject to suit for failure to take adequate precautions to prevent a hijacking or terrorist attack.
Airport authorities, however, are not protected by ATCA.
115. One should reconsider, at this point, the limitations on the scope of ATCA mentioned in note 78,
supra. Although not directly related to the issue of an international-domestic dichotomy, one must
wonder why Congress would not apply uniformity uniformly.
116. ATCA, supra note 5, § 1710(a).
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Domestic air carriers are persons who engage in intrastate or interstate commerce
within the United States. 17 ATCA does not indicate, however, how its compen-
sation scheme would operate if a domestic air carrier and a foreign air carrier
collided and all survivng passengers brought their actions in the same Federal
court. If a court determined that the legislative aim in drafting the protective
provisions of ATCA had been nationalistic, the court might rule that the foreign
air carrier was not protected. Under such circumstances, disposition of the inevi-
table collateral claims could prove to be insurmountably confusing for the court.
If, however, the foreign air carrier, in these circumstances, is protected by ATCA,
then one must ask on what rational foundation Congress has relied in drawing a
distinction between domestic and nondomestic air carriers or, for that matter,
between domestic and nondomestic air commerce.
ATCA refers throughout to "domestic" air carriers but never distinguishes
between domestic and nondomestic manufacturers or ATCs. According to
ATCA, an aircraft manufacturer is "any person who has manufactured an air-
plane in use by a domestic air carrier in domestic air commerce," '1 8 an aircraft
engine manufacturer is "any person who has manufactured engines powering air-
craft in use by a domestic air carrier in domestic air commerce," t 9 and an air
traffic controller is "any person who has supplied a system for en route or termi-
nal surveillance of aircraft involved in domestic air commerce." 20 Since there are
foreign manufacturers and ATCs that fit these descriptions,121 it is possible for a
foreign manufacturer or ATC to be protected by ATCA. Clearly the bill would
act to protect some foreign entities while excluding others from the same protec-
tion. This situation results in a dichotomy which protects foreign manufacturers
and ATCs, but denies protection to the air carriers who fly the manufacturers'
aircraft under the ATCs' guidance.
In addition to those problems which result from creating new dichotomies,
another problem exists with the scope of ATCA. Currently there are entire law-
suits which fall into the "domestic" side of the international-domestic dichotomy
under the Warsaw Convention, but which would not fall within the scope of
ATCA. The possibility of such occurrences is evident based solely on comparison
of the definitions of "scope" in both ATCA and the Warsaw Convention.
ATCA excludes "international air commerce," which is air travel for which
the contract of carriage designates "a place of departure, place of destination or an
agreed stopping point outside the United States, whether or not there be a break
in the carriage. .... "122 The Warsaw Convention pertains to international air
transportation, 123 which differs from the "international air commerce" in one ma-
jor respect. Under the Convention, transportation departing from the United
States qualifies as "international" when either the destination or a stopping place
117. Id. §§ 1701(18), (19). See supra note 77.
118. Id. § 1701(4)(1).
119. Id. § 1701(5).
120. Id. § 1701(6).
121. An example of a foreign manufacturer would be Airbus Industrie, the European consortium of
French, British, West German and Spanish aircraft manufacturers. It supplies Airbus A31Os and
Airbus A320s to Pan Am for its domestic flights.
Canadian ATCs in Toronto and Montreal are examples of foreign ATCs that monitor "en route"
domestic air commerce. ATCA, supra note 11, § 1701(6). It is not possible however, for any foreign
ATC to fit the category of "any person who has supplied a system for ... terminal surveillance of
aircraft . . . in domestic air commerce" (Id. (emphasis added)), because ATCA defines domestic air
commerce as "movement of persons or property solely interstate or intrastate within the United
States." Id. § 1701(19).
122. Supra note 11, §§ 1701(22), 1702(a).
123. Supra note 2, art. 2(1)(a).
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along the way is in a country which is a party to the Convention.1 24 Similarly, the
Convention applies when either the departure point or a stopping point along the
way is in a country which is a party to the Convention if the destination is within
the United States. 25 Therefore, if the contract of carriage were one-way from the
United States to a country which is not a party to the Warsaw Convention, let us
say Ruritania,' 26 then the flight would not be "international air transportation"
according to the convention. Yet the flight would be "international air com-
merce" according to ATCA, because the destination is "outside the United
States." Therefore, the transportation would be outside the scope of both the
Warsaw Convention, and ATCA. If ATCA is enacted as introduced, the entire
aviation industry would remain unprotected by United States law in these
situations.
HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY
A more detailed analysis of the anomalies which may arise under the the pro-
posed combination of ATCA and the Warsaw Convention may benefit from the
use of a hypothetical case study. Assume the existence of six passengers flying
Americana Airlines, a fictional United States corporation which is party to the
Montreal Agreement. In the case of each passenger, a ticket was sold by an agent
of Americana Airlines. Ruritania is a fictional country which is not a party to the
Warsaw Convention. Passengers A, B and C, are Ruritanian citizens and resi-
dents, while passengers D, E and F are citizens and residents of the United States.
As the following analysis indicates, in the event of an airline crash each passen-
ger's ticket will determine his or her right to recover and whether the extent of
that recovery will be governed by the Warsaw Convention, the ATCA or neither.
Passenger Ticket Governing Law
Passenger Ticket Governing Law
A Chicago-New York ATCA
B Chicago-New York-Ruritania- Warsaw Convention
New York-Chicago
C Ruritania-Chicago-New York Neither ATCA nor the Warsaw
Convention
D Chicago-New York ATCA
E Chicago-New York-Ruritania- Warsaw Convention
Chicago
F Chicago-New York-Ruritania Neither ATCA nor the Warsaw
Convention
Assume also that all six passengers are aboard an American flight pursuant to
their respective tickets, bound for their next stop, which is New York, but are
destined to crash during the approach. There are no survivors of the crash. The
cause of the accident is determined to be due to the combined errors of another air
carrier, the aircraft manufacturers, and the air traffic controllers.' 27 Suits are
brought by all six passengers' estates in the same federal district court.
124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
125. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(l)(a).
126. Ruritania is a fictional country which will be used further in the discussion below. Two countries with
aviation industries that are not party to the Warsaw Convention are China (Taiwan) and Holland.
KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01[3] (1984).
127. See supra note 114.
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The analysis of this hypothetical situation will concentrate on what damages
are likely to be awarded to the six passengers' estates. As an initial matter, a court
assessing damages would be required to distinguish between the American and the
Ruritanian citizens in cases where liability is governed by ATCA. Specifically,
section 1703(b) of the bill states that damages shall be computed "in accordance
with applicable rules. . . in the jurisdiction in which the individual was a resident
at the time of the aircraft incident ... 128 In the chart below it has been as-
sumed that Ruritania courts use a formula that results in about one-half the
award amount that a United States court would grant.
The chart below indicates how different types of injuries would be treated
under respective schemes. ATCA, for example, precludes recovery of punitive
damages, or damages for the emotional distress or pain and suffering of non-
surviving passengers.' 29 Under the Warsaw Convention, a court will apparently
award punitive damages only in rare circumstances, 30 but all other damages
would be awarded according to applicable domestic law.' In the chart below it
has been assumed that this court finds no grounds to avoid the $75,000 limitation
on liability imposed by the Montreal Agreement. For the purpose of comparison,
the following values represent the liability which might be assessed for each injury
indicated in a case where neither ATCA nor the Warsaw Convention apply.
Type of Injury/Damages Amount
Loss of Support $200,000.00
Pain and Suffering 20,000.00
Punitive 500,000.00
Emotional Distress 20,000.00
TOTAL 740,000.00
On the basis of the hypothetical awards that the trial court would grant under
the forum's law and according to its finding of fact, it is a simple matter of apply-
ing the respective limitation of liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention and
ATCA to arrive at the court's awards for each of the hypothetical passenger's
estate. The table below should be self-explanatory.
128. ATCA, supra note 11, § 1703(b).
129. Id. § 1703(a).
130. Punitive damages, however, could conceivably be awarded. See e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981). Although the court decided not to
award punitive damages in this case, the court's discussion of how it resolved the conflict of laws
questions clearly shows that, had the facts been different, punitive damages could and would have been
imposed.
131. See Warsaw convention, supra note 8, arts. 17-30 on the "Liability of the Carrier."
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Pain & Emotional
Passenger Contract Law Support Suffering Punitive Distress TOTAL
A Chicago-
N.Y. ATCA 10,000 0 0 0 $100,000
B Chicago-
N.Y.-
Ruritania-
N.Y.-
Chicago Warsaw 75,000 Limit Reached $ 75,000
C Ruritania-
Chicago-
N.Y. Neither 200,000 20,000 500,000 20,000 $740,000
D Chicago-
N.Y. ATCA 200,000 0 0 0 $200,000
E Chicago-
N.Y.-
Ruritania-
Chicago Warsaw 75,000 Limit Reached $ 75,000
F Chicago-
N.Y.-
Ruritania Neither 200,000 20,000 500,000 20,000 $740,000
CONCLUSION
In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland,'3 2 the Supreme Court stated: "If
federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to claims arising from aviation
accidents Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation appli-
cable to all such accidents . *...""'3 Federal judges who are experts in the field
of aviation law' 3 4 have encouraged Congress "to make a statute as comprehen-
sive, detailed, and specific as possible, for commercial aviation accidents particu-
larly with respect to damages issues."' 35 Proponents of ATCA explain that the
"principle problems created by numerous and differing state laws. . . is the diffi-
culty and delay involved in resolving conflicts of laws questions and the inequities
that result when plaintiffs similarly situated get dramatically different recoveries
because of differing state laws."' 3 6
Congress has failed to respond to these unequivocal recommendations for uni-
formity in avaiation law. While ATCA proponents have proposed legislation in-
tended to impose some uniformity on aviation cases, even they have chosen to
ignore the ailments of United States aviation law on the international side.
In addition, Congress has resisted numerous attempts by the State Depart-
ment to reform the international side of United States aviation law., 37 As a result,
some American courts have simply refused to enforce the Warsaw Convention's
limitation of liability provision. 3 1 In Franklin Mint, the opinions of both the
circuit court and the Supreme Court suggest that Congress should accept the re-
sponsibility to reform the inequities and ambiguities of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.'3 9 By refusing to accept this responsibility, Congress has elected to
perpetuate the international-domestic dichotomy. In addition to perpetuating
132. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
133. Id. at 274.
134. Most renowned was Judge Peirson M. Hall of the Central District of California who became an expert
in handling n.ultidistrict aircrash litigation. See Speiser, Dynamics of Airline Crash Litigation: What
Makes the Cases Move?, 43 J. AIR L. & COM. 565 (1977).
135. Report prepared for the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, at 25.
136. Id. at 10.
137. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
138. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been particularly adamant in this regard. See, e.g.,
supra notes 32, 47, 49, 53 & 58-61 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
Journal of Legislation
pre-existing inequities ATCA introduces new dichotomies and ambiguities which
are certain to cause even more confusion in the courts and result in even more
inconsistent judgments in individual cases than occur now.
In short, not only does ATCA fail to respond to existing problems, it tends to
aggravate them. As illustrated above gross inequity exists in the very fact that
three persons of the very same background and interests on the same flight could
end up with three different awards based solely on their travel plans.
The first step to an "orderly, fair, and expeditious" system of aviation law
must be uniformity. ATCA shows that there exist ways to protect the aviation
industry without the imposition of quantitative limits on awards of damages. The
United States could become a leader in establishing a fair system that carries out
the original purpose of the Warsaw Convention-the establishment of a uniform
system that protects the aviation industry.
This author proposes, therefore, the establishment of an ad hoc commission of
experts appointed by Congress and the President. The commission's purpose
would be to draft a comprehensive Federal aviation statute which would apply to
all aviation cases brought in the United States."# The experiences of civil law
countries and American jurisdictions following their examples14 1 have demon-
strated that such a process can result in a coherent and workable body of law.
There is also a wealth of foreign experience that would aid the commission in
developing a code of aviation law. 42 There remains a great deal for American
lawmakers to learn from an awareness of how United States aviation law fits into
the world picture and how other countries have acted with this awareness. That
education should begin without further delay.
140. See Note, The Case for a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 232
(1976). Application of the Erie doctrine in aircraft disaster litigation has caused wasted time and
resources, as well as caused conflict of laws in the Federal courts. Courts have implied a Federal cause
of action in the past, and an action should be implied from the Federal Aviation Act to prompt state
tort law in the area of aircraft disaster litigation.
141. The German code has served as the model for Switzerland, Poland, Turkey and Japan. See A. VON
MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, ch. 10 (2d ed. 1977). The French code has served
as a model for Holland, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Egypt, all of the Latin American countries, and Louisi-
ana. See M. AMOS & F. WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW (3d ed. 1967).
142. Although there is no unanimity of approach, all tend to shed light on the subject. In particular, see the
development of Germany's Air Traffic Law first adopted in 1922. Luftuerkehrsgesetzblatt of August
1, 1922, [1922] 1 Recihsgesetzblatt 681. For a general discussion of the development of French and
German law on the subject, see LOWENFELD, supra note 4, Ch. 7 § 1.51-1.53.
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